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Abstract
We analyze tacit collusion in an industry characterized by cyclical demand and long-run scale
decisions; …rms face deterministic demand cycles and choose capacity levels prior to competing
in prices. Our focus is on the nature of prices. We …nd that two types of price wars may exist.
In one, collusion can involve periods of mixed strategy price wars. In the other, consistent
with the Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) de…nition of price wars, we show that collusive prices
can also become countercyclical. We also establish pricing patterns with respect to the relative
prices in booms and recessions. If the marginal cost of capacity is high enough, holding current
demand constant, prices in the boom will be generally lower than the prices in the recession;
this reverses the results of Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991). In contrast, if the marginal cost
of capacity is low enough, then prices in the boom will be generally higher than the prices in
the recession. For costs in an intermediate range, numerical examples are calculated to show
speci…c pricing patterns.
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Inferring collusion is di¢cult because there rarely is a “smoking gun.” Instead, empirical research
hasfocusedondynamicpricing patternspredicted by theoriesofcollusion that areinconsistent with
static models of competition. One such strand of literature tests whether observed equilibrium
prices are consistent with the predicted collusive prices when …rms face cyclical demand. This
literature leverages the result that when …rms face demand cycles, conditional on current demand,
priceswill be higher ifdemand is expected to risein thefuture, compared to ifit is expectedto fall.1
We show that when …rms face endogenous capacity constraints, these predicted pricing patterns
can change; therefore, ignoring capacity constraints may lead us to conclude collusion does not
exist when, in fact, it exists.
Collusion when …rms face capacity constraints, has recently been the focus of a number of
antitrust cases in both the US and Europe. The US Department of Justice recently launched
an investigation into capacity collusion in the DRAM market. Mergers increasing the ability of
…rms to coordinate have also concerned the European Commission. The Commission blocked the
Airtours and First Choice Holidays merger in the package holiday travel market partly because of
concerns about an increased coordination in capacities; in this industry capacity levels are chosen
well in advance of consumer bookings. Coordinating on capacity was also the Commission’s initial
objection to the UPM-Kymmene/Haindl newsprint merger.2
Antitrust policy-makers have noted the di¢culty of uncovering collusion in markets with strict
capacity constraints. Coordinating on capacities can lead to lower capacity levels and outputs
closer to these capacity levels. Therefore, if one observed the market, taking capacity levels as
given, they may conclude that collusion does not exist, presuming instead that …rms are simply
capacity constrained. This added di¢culty increases the importance of understanding how prices
behave when …rms collude on both capacities and prices.
In this paper, we analyze the collusive behavior of …rms where changing the scale of opera-
tion takes a signi…cant period of time and market demand ‡uctuates cyclically. Our goal is to
establish testable implications with respect to pricing behavior along thedemand cycle. Firms face
1See, for example, Borenstein and Shepard (1996) and Rosenbaum and Sukharomana (2001).
2While the Commission ultimately concluded that coordinating on capacities was too di¢cult, ouranalysissuggests
that this conclusion may have been unwarranted.3
deterministic demand cycles and choose capacity levels beforecompeting in prices. This represents
industries where the cycles are frequent, or capacity is di¢cult to alter; for example, the holiday
travel market cited above, electricity markets where demand cycles each day and capacity changes
can takeover 18 months, or the gasoline re…ning market where demand exhibitsannual ‡uctuations
while re…ning capacity has remained fairly constant.3
Theinclusionofthescaledecisionasaformal choicevariableinthedynamicgamecandrastically
change the collusive pricing patterns and the e¤ectiveness of collusion. Capacity constraints have
two countervailing e¤ects on …rms’ ability to collude. First, low capacity levels may reduce the
incentive for a …rm to deviate from collusion by limiting the immediate gain from defection. That
is, ifa …rm’s capacity is less than themarket demand at the collusive price, the …rm cannot supply
the entire market after a low price defection. On the other hand, low capacity levels can decrease
the severity of the credible punishment after a deviation, decreasing the incentive to collude. We
…nd that whether low or high capacities best facilitate collusion depends on how expensive it is to
install; hence, the price of capacity is a key determinant of collusive behavior. Furthermore, we
…nd that endogenizing capacity constraints can have a signi…cant impact on the e¤ectiveness of
collusion, since …rms are able to choose capacity levels to increase the collusive pro…ts.
Our primary analysis is concerned with collusive pricing patterns. Consistent with the existing
literature, weidentify two types ofpricewars. Rotemberg and Saloner (1986) show that when each
period’s demand depends on an independent identically distributed (iid) shock and there are no
capacity constraints, prices may be inversely correlated with the level of demand. Because the gain
from cheating is greater when demand is higher (and the punishment is independent of thecurrent
level of demand), prices may fall when demand increases in order to counteract the incentive to
cheat; we refer to these counter-cyclical prices as mild price wars.4
A second type of price war also exists. Consistent with Staiger and Wolak (1992), we …nd
under certain capital prices and discount levels, …rms will switch between cooperative and non-
cooperative mixed-pricing behavior; we refer to theseperiods as severe pricewars. As themarginal
cost of capacity increases, severe price wars are only possible in periods of higher and higher
demand. Unlike the mild price wars, severe price wars correspond to periods where one …rm
actually undercuts the other in equilibrium.5
3Other industries such as cement, railroad, steel, heavy electrical equipment and petroleum also loosely …t this
abstract description. Scherer and Ross (1990) describe these industries as all having relatively high concentration,
high …xed costs, relatively low marginal costs and non-stationary demand patterns. The high …xed costs come from
the requirement of long-term pre-commitment to production technologies and/or resource investment.
4While this does not represent a price war in the sense that …rms revert to non-cooperative pricing, we keep
Rotemberg and Saloner’s nomenclature.
5Green and Porter (1984) also …nd reversion to non-cooperative behavior in a model of collusion.; however, this4
We also establish testable implications with respect to the relative prices during booms and
recessions. The …rst of these states, if the marginal cost of capacity is high enough, then for equal
current demandlevels, pricesin booms will generally belower than prices inrecessions. In thiscase,
capacity is too costly to hold asextrapunishment.6 Instead, …rmschooselow capacity levelsto limit
the gain from deviations in high demand periods. Since low capacity levels lead non-cooperative
prices to be highest in these periods, the near-term punishment after a defection is smallest when
demand is growing. For most model speci…cations, the converse is also true: If the cost of capacity
is low enough, then prices in the booms will be generally higher than prices in the recessions when
…rms collude. In this case, capacity is cheap enough that holding large amounts, to increase the
crediblelevel ofpunishment, ismost helpful to maximizecollusive pro…ts. Therefore, the near-term
loss after a deviation is largest when demand is growing. If the cost is in an intermediate range,
no such blanket pricing patterns can be established; the relationship can change along the demand
cycle.
To further examine pricing patterns, we calculate numerical examples for di¤erent costs at
varying discount factors. Numerical examples with extremely low costs show very similar pricing
patterns to the limitless capacity model of Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991). As in Haltiwanger
and Harrington (1991), we also …nd that prices are pro-cyclical for high discount factors, but can
becomeextremely counter-cyclical if…rmsare impatient enough. Withhigh capacity costs, at equal
current demandlevels, collusivepricesarelowerin theboom thanin therecessionandneverbecome
counter-cyclical. The prices always remain high in the largest demand periods, while severe price
wars can occur in the lowest demand periods. An intermediate cost speci…cation shows patterns of
both the low and high cost cases. For most discounts, prices are higher in the low demand periods
of the boom than the low demand periods in the recession, while lower in the high demand periods
of the boom than in the high demand periods of the recession.
Our results are not limited to a model with perfectly in‡exible capacities. In Section 7 we show
that as long as thereis su¢cient timelag to adjust capacity and a positive …xed cost ofadjustment,
thepricing implications of themodel are identical to the case of perfectly in‡exiblecapacities. This
is not surprising given that our model can be construed as one with in…nite adjustment costs.
is driven by information asymmetries rather than capacity constraints.
6We follow the existing literature and refer to booms as periods where demand is growing and recessions as periods
where demand is contracting.5
1.1 Relation to existing literature
This paper builds on a literature that began with Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). Rotemberg and
Saloner analyze an industry where …rms compete over an in…nite horizon, face iid demand shocks
in each period, and have in…nite capacities; …rms observe these demand shocks prior to choosing
prices. In this setting, as the discount factor falls away from unity, collusive prices will be lower
when demand is high. This is because the gains from cheating are highest during high demand
periodsand thepunishment is independent of thecurrent demand state (because of the iid demand
shocks). As such, prices may be lower the greater is demand. Rotemberg and Saloner refer to this
lowering of prices as a price war.
Kandori (1991) generalizes themodel ofRotemberg and Saloner to thesetting of Markov uncer-
tainty in demand levels. For a class of demand shocks, thecollusive prices are shown to exhibit the
same price wars during booms—prices lowered from monopoly levels in high demand states—as
in the iid case. The key to this result is that the Markov distribution approaches a stationary
distribution over time.
Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) extend the model of Rotemberg and Saloner in a di¤erent
direction by assuming …rms face deterministic demand cycles. Their results demonstrate that
stationary future demand is far from an innocuous assumption and, in fact, drives the price war
results of Rotemberg and Saloner. Once demand movements are no longer independent, the loss
from punishment in the future depends on the state of demand today. With deterministic demand
cycles, the losses from punishment di¤er for all periods of the cycle; the losses will be greater
when demand is going to grow in the near future. Based on this key insight, Haltiwanger and
Harrington show that, holding current demand …xed, …rms sustain weakly higher collusive prices
in a boom period than a recession period. When the …rms are su¢ciently impatient, prices can
become counter-cyclical just as in the Rotemberg and Saloner model.
Bagwell and Staiger (1997) study a model of repeated price competition with Markov uncer-
tainty in demand growth rates; the growth rate switches randomly between a high and a low rate.
Under this speci…cation the concept of recessions and booms can be de…ned analogously to Halti-
wanger and Harrington, ifshocks are positively correlated. With positivecorrelation, if the growth
rateis high today, it ismorelikely to behigh tomorrow, hencethis isa boom. Conversely, when the
growth rate is low, it is more likely to be low tomorrow, this is a recession. As in the Haltiwanger
and Harrington model, holding the current level of demand constant, the expected future loss after
a deviation is greater during a boom than in the recession, since demand levels are expected to6
remain high.7 Therefore, because the immediate gain from a deviation is the same, …rms sustain
higher collusive price in the boom.
Staiger and Wolak (1992) extend the model of Rotemberg and Saloner in another direction
by keeping iid demand shocks, but including endogenous capacity constraints. The supergame is
the in…nite repetition of a game that involves …rst, a choice of capacities by both …rms when the
demand for the period is uncertain. Then, after observing theother …rm’s capacity and the realized
demand state, the…rms choosetheir prices. Thesingle-period subgameis an extension of theKreps
and Scheinkman (1983) model to include iid demand uncertainty.8 The introduction of capacity
constraints changes one primary analytical feature of the Rotemberg and Saloner model: The
capacity constraints limit the gains from cheating in high demand states by limiting the quantity
a …rm can sell when they cheat. Clearly, if the demand realization is high enough such that the
sum of the capacities of the two …rms is less than the demand at the monopoly price, then no …rm
gains from deviating in that state. Staiger and Wolak show that the nature of price wars depends
on the degreeof excess capacity in an industry. Mild price wars, occur in demand states with little
excess capacity, while severe, mixed-strategy, price wars occur in states with more excess capacity.
Fabra (2006) also studiescollusionundercapacity constraintsand cyclical demand. Ouranalysis
di¤ers in two important respects. First, Fabra assumes exogenous capacity levels; we …nd endoge-
nizing capacity can have large e¤ects. More importantly, Fabra limits the analysis to the critical
point for mild price wars—the point on the cycle where prices …rst deviate from monopoly levels;
we derive more general results with respect to prices. She …nds that if the exogenous capacity
constraints are large enough, the critical point for price wars is during the recession. While if the
capacity constraints are low enough, the critical point is in the boom of the cycle.
2 Preliminaries
Consider an industry with two …rms and a market for a single homogeneous product. The index i
is used to identify an arbitrary …rm, where i = 1; 2. The two …rms are in…nitely lived and modeled
as initially choosing capacities, then interacting in a Bertrand-Edgeworth price game in each period
7One di¤erence being that in the Haltiwanger and Harrington model there is no uncertainty. Another distinction
between the two models is that Bagwell and Staiger’s model has only multiplicative demand shifts. This restriction
leads to a single-collusive price for all boom states and a single collusive price for all recession states both independent
of the demand level.
8There is a substantial literature on dynamic oligopoly games of capacity and price competition with stationary
demand, including Brock and Scheinkman (1985), Benoit and Krishna (1987), Davidson and Deneckere (1990),
Compte, Frédéric and Rey (2002) and Besanko and Dorazelski (2004).7
that follows. The parameter ￿ is a …nite real number that represents the state of demand. The
market demand function at any time t; given the state ￿t 2 R+; is D(¢; ￿t) : R+ 7! R+. The inverse
demand for any time t; given the state ￿t 2 R+; is P(¢; ￿t) : R+ 7! R+. Demand is assumed to
follow deterministic cyclical ‡uctuations over time based on the parameter ￿. The structure of
demand movements is given by cycles that repeat every ¿ (…nite) periods.9 The market demand
function follows the deterministic cyclical time path:
￿t =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
￿1 if t 2 f1;¿ +1; 2¿ +1;:::g;
￿2 if t 2 f2;¿ +2; 2¿ +2;:::g;
. . .
￿¿ if t 2 f¿; 2¿; 3¿;:::g:
(1)
Each …rm has a capacity xi 2 R+, the absolute limit on the number of units it can produce.
The marginal cost of production is zero up to the …rm’s capacity and in…nite for any quantity
beyond. The two …rms have a common discount factor – 2 (0; 1). We label the generic ¿-period
cycle of demand parameters as £ = f￿1;￿2;:::; ￿¿g ½R¿
+. In order to simplify notation, we de…ne
X(￿) = D(0; ￿) < 1 and P(￿) = P(0;￿) < 1, for all ￿ 2 £. It will also be useful to denote by
X = max￿2£ X(￿); the maximum demand at a price of zero over all states ￿ 2 £.
The …rst three assumptions establish the basic properties of the industry demand function.
Assumption 1 For each ￿ 2 £ the quantity X(￿) is such that 8q 2 [0;X(￿)), P(q; ￿) 2 (0;1)
and 8q ¸ X(￿), P(q;￿) = 0. On (0;X(￿)), P(q;￿) is twice-continuously di¤erentiable, strictly
decreasing and concave in q.
Assumption 2 Demand is increasing in ￿ 2 £, such that for all p 2 (0; P(￿)), D(p;￿0) >D(p;￿)
if and only if ￿0 > ￿.







if ￿0 ¸￿ for all ￿ and ￿0 in £.






9Similar assumptions about the structure of demand were introduced in Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991),
although the assumptions we use are most similar to Fabra (2006).8
The next two assumptions specify the properties of the capacity cost function each …rm faces.
Assumption 4 The capacity cost function is homogeneous across …rms. The marginal cost is the
constant c >0, such that each …rm’s cost function is ci(xi) =cxi for i = 1;2:
Assumption 5 The industry cost of capacity permits positive pro…t:





In order to construct speci…c results about pricing patterns, it is helpful to make a regularity
assumption on the structure of the demand cycles.
Assumption 6 The cycle has a single peak:
￿1 <￿2 <::: <￿b t >::: > ￿¿ >￿1.
The …nal assumption is important; this minimal regularity of the demand cycles is required
to make clear statements describing collusive pricing patterns. Two important features of this
model arethe deterministic nature of demand cycles and the exogenous …rm structure. This model
pertains to industries where entry or exit of …rms is unlikely to happen.10 From this point onward
we impose assumptions 1-6, although only results pertaining to pricing patterns over the demand
cycle require assumption 6.
3 The non-cooperative equilibrium
Thenon-cooperativeequilibrium ofa singlecycle serves as a baseline to compare themost-collusive
supergame equilibrium. Thus, we …rst describe the subgame perfect equilibrium of a single cycle
stage-game. Since each demand cycleofpricing gamesis the same, thesubgameperfect equilibrium
for a single cycle will be all that is needed to construct the non-cooperative subgame perfect
equilibrium of the in…nitely repeated game. First, we outline the timing of the stage-game.
10The deterministic structure of demand has proven itself useful in the case of the Bertrand supergame and provided
results conceptually analogous to the uncertain Markov setting where the end of booms and recessions is unknown.
Here we are referring to the similarity of results in Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) with deterministic demand
cycles relative to Bagwell and Staiger (1997) with Markov demand cycles.9
3.1 The timing of a typical stage-game
The game takes place over a single demand cycle ￿1;￿2;:::; ￿¿.
Period 1 : At the beginning of the game, each …rm i = 1; 2 chooses xi independently and
simultaneously. Then each …rm i = 1; 2, observes the other …rms capacity xj and chooses p1(i) 2
(0; P(￿1)] independently and simultaneously. From this point on, j is used as j = 1; 2 such that
j 6=i.
Period 2 : Each …rm observes the other …rm’s choice p1(j). Then the …rms choose p2(i) 2
(0; P(￿2)], independently and simultaneously.
. . .
Period ¿ : Each …rm observes the other …rms choice of p¿¡1(j). The …rms choose p¿(i) 2
(0; P(￿¿)] independently and simultaneously.
3.2 The pricing stage-games
There are ¿ pricing stage-games that follow the initial capacity choice. Here we …x the two …rms’
capacity choices at arbitrary values x1 and x2 and examine the pricing in each stage-game over the
¿-period cycle.
We assume the demand is rationed using the Surplus Maximizing Rationing rule.11 Dasgupta
and Maskin (1986a, 1986b) provethe existence of the Nash equilibrium in each pricing stage-game.
Following Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), the revenue of the pricing subgames can be split into
three regions. To help characterize the equilibrium revenue, we de…ne the Cournot best response
functions as follows







11We are con…dent that the character of the most-collusive equilibrium in the paper can be extended to alternate
demand rationing rules, particularly, if the Beckman demand rationing rule were assumed. The primary di¤erence
in the most-collusive equilibrium would be the possibility of severe price wars in higher demand periods. Davidson
and Deneckere (1986) provide a characterization of the non-cooperative pricing subgame with Beckman rationing.10
The unique-equilibrium expected revenue function, given capacities x1 and x2, is:
Rn




P(x1 +x2;￿)xi if x1 · r(x2;￿) and x2 ·r(x1; ￿)
0 if minfx1; x2g ¸ X(￿)
R¤
i(x1; x2;￿) otherwise.
The third region only has a mixed-strategy pricing equilibrium. The expected revenues in this
region depend on which …rm possesses more capacity,
R¤








R(xi; ￿); R(xi;￿)] if xi < xj.
Thefunction R(xj;￿) isthefollower’spro…t ina zero cost Stackelberg game. Denoteby pn
i (x1;x2;￿)
the non-cooperative pricing of …rm i given capacities x1and x2.
The Nash equilibrium of each pricing stage-game constructs the unique non-cooperative sub-
game perfect equilibrium of the entire pricing cycle game, given …xed capacities. The reasoning
is as follows: If in each time, t ¸ 1; the other …rm prices according to the Nash equilibrium of
each individual stage-game, the best response is to price Nash in the current and all subsequent
stage-games.
3.3 The capacity choice stage-game
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) prove, in a sequential capacity and price game with one period of
pricing, the unique Nash equilibrium is in pure strategies and has thesameprice and quantity sold
as the analogous Cournot game. In our setting, the non-cooperative subgame perfect capacities
will generally not be the same as the analogous game with Cournot pricing. Even the existence of
an equilibrium with symmetric pure strategy capacities is not guaranteed. This issue is studied in
Lepore (2006), where it is shown that there are equilibria that involve pure symmetric capacities
in only two cases: (i) the demand cycle has very little variance in demand periods and the cost of
capacity is relatively high, or (ii) the demand cycle includes many large similar demand periods,
few very small demand periods and the cost of capacity is low enough. For any demand cycle
that does not …t the description of (i) or (ii), all non-cooperative equilibrium will generally involve
asymmetric capacities.12
12Lepore (2006) studies a two-stage game where demand is uncertain at the capacity choice stage, but is realized
before …rms choose prices. This structure nests our single-cycle capacity stage-game as a special case, where the







4 The most-collusive equilibrium
In this section, we examine the in…nite-time game with collusive pricing. We focus on the ba-
sic properties of the most-collusive equilibrium. The most-collusive equilibrium is the symmetric
subgame perfect equilibrium with the maximal joint pro…t for the industry.13 By assumption, the
most-collusiveequilibrium is alwayssymmetricin termsof pure strategiesfor capacities, ifthereis a
feasible symmetric equilibrium. If the set of feasible symmetric capacity subgame perfect equilibria
is empty, then the most-collusive equilibrium can involve asymmetric capacities. In the primary
analysis of the paper, we restrict attention to symmetric capacity collusion.14
The most-collusiveequilibrium issymmetric in terms ofpure strategies forprices as well, unless
the non-cooperative equilibrium pricing yields more revenue than any incentive compatible pricing
strategy. In that case, themost-collusive pricing is the non-cooperative pricing equilibrium for that
periodsstage-game and might only be symmetric in terms of mixed strategies and expected pro…ts.
The most-collusive equilibrium may be supported by many punishment strategies if …rms are
patient enough. As the discount factors fall away from unity, an ‘optimal’ punishment, as de…ned
by Abreu (1986, 1988), is among the only symmetric punishments that can support the complete
set of subgame perfect equilibria for all discounts. The most-collusive equilibrium does not neces-
sarily exist unless an optimal punishment exists to support it. In the case of exogenous capacity
constraints, Lambson (1987) proves that the optimal punishment exists and is at the security level;
the security level is the minimum pro…t that a …rm’s competitor can force upon it. Reversion to
non-cooperative pricing forever after a cheat yields security level payo¤s. Accordingly, we use non-
cooperative reversion to calculate the optimal punishment, although it is not necessary to think of
the …rms actually using this non-cooperative threat. The ‘optimal’ punishment is not unique and,
in fact, Lambson has shown that there is a stick-carrot type punishment that is also optimal.
At the upper bound, when the …rms are extremely patient (or, analogously, the period length
is very short), the most-collusive equilibrium might be identical to the monopoly equilibrium in
prices with each …rm having half of the monopoly capacity. The unique monopoly capacity choice
is labeled xm(c; –). Firms may also be able to sustain monopoly prices if total capacity is greater
than the monopoly level. At capacity x, the unique capacity constrained-monopoly price for each
period t is given by:
pm
t (x) =arg max
p2[0;P(￿)]
fD(p;￿t)pjD(p;￿t) ·xg.
13Although the name, most-collusive equilibrium, has been used predominantly in the literature, the more appro-
priate name might be the “best symmetric equilibrium” used by Kandori (1991).
14In Appendix II subsection 10.2, the reasoning behind this restriction is discussed.12
Welabel theconstrained-monopoly pricesat theuniquemonopoly capacity aspm
t (c) =pm
t (xm(c; –))
for all t =f1;2;:::g.15
The solution to the most-collusive equilibrium involves multiple incentive compatibility con-
straints foreach pricing stage-game and the initial capacity choice. We will explain the equilibrium
capacities and prices following a backward induction-typeapproach. First, wedescribe theway the
pricing incentive compatibility constraints dictate equilibrium pricing behavior given …xed sym-
metric capacities. Then, the capacity incentive compatibility constraints are analyzed taking the
most-collusive pricing behavior as given. The next two subsections provide some insight into how
the interaction of these constraints dictates the most-collusive capacity levels. The unique most-
collusive equilibrium price strategies, given the symmetric capacities x1 = x2 = x, are denoted
by pc
t(x;–) for t = f1;2;:::g. The most-collusive capacities and prices are denoted by xc(c; –) and
pc
t(c;–) = pc
t(xc(c;–); –) for t =f1; 2; :::g, respectively.16
4.1 The pricing constraints
For each period, the pricing stage-game incentive compatibility constraints can naturally be sep-
arated into two constraints. The …rst is the standard collusive pricing constraint for …rms under-
cutting the collusive price, guaranteeing that the immediate gain from an undercut cannot exceed
the future loss from punishment. The second is a by-product of capacity constraints that only
applies if theunder-cutting constraint is already binding. Ifthe price in any period is bound signif-
icantly below the monopoly level by the under-cutting constraint, then the possibility of a higher
price deviation also exists. This over-cutting constraint is a feature unique to models with capacity
constraintssincedepending on therationing rule, a …rm may havean incentive to increase itsprice.
1) The incentive compatibility constraint for under-cutting. The arbitrary price vector
p =(pt)1
t=1 is in the set of under-cutting incentive compatible collusive prices if it is such that,17
Gu
t (pt;x1;x2)(i) ·L(p; x1; x2; –)(i), for all i = 1;2, and t =1;2; :::
where,
15The proof of both existence and uniqueness of the monopoly prices and capacity is provided in Appendix II.
16The existence and uniqueness of the most-collusive equilibrium prices and a discussion of the conditions guaran-
teeing incentive compatible most-collusive capacities is the primary subject of Appendix II.
17Note thatDi(pt;￿t) depends on the speci…cation ofa particular collusive demand rationing rule. See the Appendix
II for a discussion of the range of possible rules.13
Gu
t (pt;x1;x2)(i) =pt(minfxi; D(pt;￿t)g¡Di(pt; ￿t)),
Lt(p;x1;x2;–)(i) =
P1
s=t+1 –s¡1 (psDi(ps;￿s) ¡Rn
i (x1;x2;￿s)).
2) The incentive compatibility constraint for over-cutting. The arbitrary price vector
p =(pt)1
t=1 is in the set of over-cutting incentive compatible collusive prices if it is such that,
Go
t(pt; x1; x2)(i) ·Lt(p;x1;x2;–)(i), for all i =1; 2, and t = 1;2;:::
where,
Go
t(pt; x1; x2)(i) = max
‰t2[0;P(￿t0]
f‰t minfD(‰t;￿t); xj ¡D(pt;￿t)gg ¡ptDi(pt; ￿t).
In some cases, it is possible that there is no pure strategy price vector that satis…es both the
over-cutting and under-cutting constraints. In this case, the highest incentive compatibleexpected
revenue comes from non-cooperative mixed-strategy pricing.
4.2 The most-collusive pricing determined by the constraints
The most-collusive pricing in each period is determined by whether the …rst constraint is binding,
both are binding, or neither binds. The most-collusive revenue in each period depends on the …xed
capacity levels, x1 and x2, and the two constraints to subgame perfect pricing. At this point, we
impose symmetry in the …rms’ capacity choices so that x1 =x2 =x. In any period, there are three
basic most-collusive pricing patterns. Which of the three pricing patterns takes place, depends on
how the demand parameter of a given time period relates to the most-collusive capacity.18
Region 1 (constrained-monopoly pricing) Thecollusive price for a period of demand in this
region is sustainable at or above the single-period unconstrained-monopoly level. We denote by
pum
t the unconstrained-monopoly price for the period ￿t, formally,
pum
t = arg max
p2[0;P(￿t)]
fpD(p;￿t)g:
Ifthecapacity constraint binds so strongly that no undercut can increasethedemand for both …rms,
then themost-collusivepriceisabovethesingle-period unconstrained-monopoly level . Thisiswhere
18The characterization of the pricing regions follows similar lines to Staiger and Wolak (1992) with the exception
that they assume linear demand.14
￿t is such that D(pum
t ;￿t) ¸ 2x. The revenue of each …rm in this region of demand parameters is
P(2x;￿t)x. Price is higher than the single-period unconstrained-monopoly level for time period t,
i.e. pc
t(c;–) >pum
t . The prices are at the unconstrained-monopoly level if D(pum
t ;￿t) ·2x, thereby
permitting sustainable joint surplus maximizing revenue. When capacities are su¢cient to meet
demand at the unconstrained-monopoly price, each …rm earns half the unconstrained-monopoly
pro…t for that single state: pum
t D(pum
t ; ￿t)=2.
Region 2 (Mild price wars) These are periods such that each …rm’s under-cutting incentive
compatibility constraint binds at the constrained-monopoly price, but the over-cutting constraint
does not play a roll. In this region, pc
t(c;–) is lower than pm
t (2xc(c; –)) and since ptD(pt; ￿t)=2 and
Ls(pc;x; –) for s 6= t are increasing in pt on (0; pum
t ), the most-collusive price in this region is the
highest price that is under-cutting incentive compatible. More precisely, pc
t(c;–) is the largest price
less than the unconstrained-monopoly price such that the incentive constraint holds with equality
for period t.
Region 3 (non-cooperative pricing) In this region, thehighest revenuelevel that satis…es the
incentivecompatibility constraints isfrom thenon-cooperativepricing strategies. Thus, the pricing
and revenue will be at the non-cooperative levels.
A severe mixed-strategy price war period must be within this region. In particular, mixed-
strategy price wars occur for demand periods where, for at least one …rm i, xi 2 (r(￿t; xj);X(￿t))
and for all p that are incentive compatible, pD(p;￿t)=2 <Rn(x;￿t).
4.3 The capacity constraint
The most-collusive capacity choices involve incentive compatibility constraints to insure no devia-
tion from the collusive capacity level is bene…cial to either …rm. We de…ne discounted pro…ts, at
the most-collusive prices, given capacities x1 = x2 = x, as ¦c(x; c;–). The pro…t from deviating


















¦n(xi; x; c;–) =
P1
t=1 –t¡1(Rn(xi; x;￿t) ¡cxi).15
The incentive compatibility constraint: Capacities An arbitrary capacity x 2 [0;X] is in
the set of symmetric incentive compatible collusive capacity levels if:
¦c(x;c; –) ¸ max
xi2[0;X]
f¦n(xi;x;c; –)g.
This incentiveconstraint is morecomplex than the pricing incentive constraints. If thediscount
factor is far enough away from one, then themost-collusive prices interact in substantiveways with
the capacity choices.
4.4 The most-collusive capacities determined by the constraint
Region 1 (Monopoly(ish) capacities) If the capacity incentive constraint does not bind at
the joint pro…t maximizing capacities, then xc(c; –) = b xc(c; –) is the most-collusive equilibrium.
b xc(c;–) is de…ned as:
b xc(c; –) 2 arg max
»2[0;X]
f¦c(»;c; –)g.
This is half the capacity a monopolist would choose given the most-collusive prices. In spite of
the fact that the capacity incentive constraint does not bind, the most-collusive capacities are not
necessarily half the monopolists capacity. The most-collusive prices might be di¤erent than the
constrained-monopoly prices which is likely to lead to a di¤erent choice of joint pro…t maximizing
capacities. Hence, wedenotethemost-collusivecapacitiesinthiscontext asmonopoly-ish capacities.
If the most-collusive prices are all monopoly prices, then 2b xc(c;–) = xm(c; –). In this region,
capacities are always symmetric.
Region 2 (Symmetric Capacities) In this region, the capacity incentive constraint binds
strongly that b xc(c;–) is not incentive compatible, but theset of symmetric pure strategy capacities
that satisfy the incentive constraint is non-empty. The only capacities that are in the incentive
compatible set are capacities larger than b xc(c;–).19 In this region, the most-collusive capacities
can range greatly, lying anywhere inside the interval [b xc(c;–); X]. If the cost of capacity is low
enough, the capacities will be close to the upper bound X for most discounts. It is also possible
19At any symmetric capacity level x < b x
c(c; –); the most-collusive pro…t is lower than at b x
c(c;–). Based on
Proposition 3 in Benoit and Krishna (1987), for each ￿t; R
n
i (z; x;￿t) ¸ R
n
i(z; b x
c(c; –); ￿t) 8 z 2 [0;X], hence
¦
n(z; x;c; –) ¸ ¦
n(z;b x
c(c; –); c; –) 8z 2 [0;X]; – 2 (0; 1) and c 2 (0; c(–)). These two facts together imply the
incentive constraint for the most-collusive capacity choice is violated for all x < b x
c(c; –).16
that the marginal cost of capacity is high enough that the capacities will never get very large and
the capacities will barely stray from b xc(c;–).20
Region 3 (Asymmetric capacities) In this region, the incentive constraint binds so harshly
that the only admissible capacities are the non-cooperative capacities given the most-collusive
revenue. In this case, an equilibrium with symmetric pure strategy capacities is not likely to exist.
There is no collusion in capacities, instead they are the result of competition with most-collusive
prices. For much of the subsequent analysis, we do not consider discount-cost combinations in this
region.
5 Dynamic pricing patterns
Here wepresent some general properties of the most-collusive equilibrium ofthein…nite timegame.
As in most collusion games, the level of collusive pro…ts that can be maintained by the optimal
punishment varies with the discount factor of the two …rms. If the discount factor is close enough
to one, monopoly prices are sustainable and most-collusive capacities are symmetric.
Proposition 1 There exists –(c) 2 (0;1) such that for all – 2 [–(c); 1), pc
t(c; –) = pm
t (2xc(c; –)) for
all t 2 f1;:::; ¿g.
The proof of all propositions and theorems presented in the body of the text are located in
Appendix I. The proof of Proposition 1 is based on …rst establishing that there is a discount
factor where all collusive prices are at the monopoly level. This is essentially a Folk theorem for
capacity constrained pricing in this speci…c class of models. To show this for a single period t, we
…x capacities at an arbitrary level and all other prices at the constrained-monopoly levels. The
constrained-monopoly price level is sustainable in period t, if the discount factor is one. The fact
that the future loss is continuous and goes to zero as – goes to zero is used to prove that the
monopoly price is sustainable if and only if the discount is greater or equal to –(t;x) < 1. The
discount factor –(c), is the smallest discount such that all most-collusive prices are at constrained-
monopoly levels at the most-collusive capacities, for all – 2 [–(c); 1]:
In contrast, thereisa discount factorsuchthat, forany discount factorabovethislevel themost-
collusive equilibrium involves pure strategy capacities and is not the non-cooperative equilibrium.
20In Section 6, the high cost (c = 0:05) numerical example involves capacity levels fairly close to half the monopolist
capacities for all discounts where collusive pricing is sustainable.17
Proposition 2 There exists –(c) 2 (0; –(c)], such that for all – 2 (–(c); 1) the most-collusive
equilibrium involves pure symmetric capacities, xc(c;–) and pc
t(c; –) 6= pn(xc(c;–); ￿t) for at least
one t 2 f1; ::;¿g.
In all that follows, therangeofdiscount factors wherethemost-collusiveequilibriumisprimarily
studied, lie between –(c) and –(c). In our numerical examples, the upper bound discount –(c) is
approximately 0:64 in the lowest cost example, and approximately 0:94 when costs are extremely
high. The lower bound discount –(c) ranges from just above0:5 at thelowest cost, to approximately
0:76 when costs arehigh. Both discount factorstend to increaseas the cost ofcapacity increases so
that the interval of discount factors between –(c) and –(c) has a fairly wide range across di¤erent
levels of c.
These two propositions construct the outline of the most-collusive pricing picture shown in
Figure 1. We will expand on this diagram throughout the section to complete the picture of the
most-collusive equilibrium pricing behavior.
5.1 Pricing patterns
The goal of this section is to understand the pricing patterns of the most-collusive equilibrium
when monopoly prices are not sustainable in all periods. Towards this end, there are two classes
of results: locations of mixed-strategy price wars and general properties of prices in booms versus
recessions. Both sets of results depend on the cost of capacity.
Thepresenceofcapacityconstraintsaltersboth thegainsandlossesfromdefecting at constrained-
monopoly prices. When demand is su¢ciently high, a defecting …rm is unable to capture theentire
market. Similarly, during high near-term demandperiods, theseverity ofthepunishment is reduced
since non-cooperative prices are no longer zero. The relative magnitude of these two countervail-
ing incentives drives the pricing patterns we would expect to see under collusion. To establish a
concrete example of the e¤ect of changes in demand levels on incentives of the …rms, we graph the
single-period expected gains and losses from cheating at the monopoly price. The …gures illustrate
the single-period gains and losses from optimal defection at unconstrained monopoly prices when
demand is of the form, D(p; ￿) =￿¡p.
In any period with demand parameter ￿, thepro…t from deviating isdetermined by its relation-
ship to capacity. There are three distinct forms of the gains relative to ￿, depending on the …xed
symmetric capacities. For low demand states, the gains from defection rise with demand as the
…rm is able to undercut its competitor and capture the entire market. There is a point, however,18
where the …rm is not able to meet all of the additional demand from defection and the gains from
cheating fall with ￿. At somepoint, an individual …rm is producing at capacity under collusion and






8 if ￿ ·2x,
￿
2x¡ ￿2
8 if ￿ 2 (2x;4x),
0 if ￿ ¸4x.
Figure 2 plots G(￿; x) with the capacity …xed at x = 2 in terms of the demand parameter.
The gains are non-monotonic in ￿ and if the demand parameter is large enough relative to the
capacity constraints, then the largest gain from deviation will bezero. Incontrast, without capacity
constraints, as the demand parameter ￿ increases, the gain from deviating increases inde…nitely.
The losses in the …rst period following defection can also be characterized by the period’s value
of ￿ relative to capacity. As with the gains, these losses initially rise and then begin to fall with ￿.
When the capacity levels are su¢ciently large, such that prices fall to zero, defection implies a loss
of half of the monopoly pro…ts. If the …rms are unable to commit to zero prices upon defection,
then the losses from defection are reduced by an amount that depends on the installed capacity.
Finally, if demand is su¢ciently large such that the combined capacity base cannot meet demand
at the monopoly price, then there is no penalty from defecting. We can characterize the losses in
the …rst period following defection as:
L(￿;x) =
8
> > > > > <
> > > > > :
￿2





4 if ￿ 2 (x; 3x],
￿2
8 ¡(￿¡2x)x if ￿ 2 (3x;4x),
0 if ￿ ¸4x.
In Figure 3 we plot the …rst period’s losses with demand parameter ￿, after a deviation, when
x =2.
What will drive our results with respect to pricing along the cycle is that for any two time
periods on opposite sides of the cycle s and t; such that ￿s = ￿t; the gains from defection are the
same, but the discounted losses are di¤erent since the sequence of demand states that follow are
not identical. For equal demand levels, whether prices are higher in the boom or the recession, will
depend on where next period’s demand falls in relation to Figure 3. This in turn depends on the
endogenously chosen capacity levels. In the two following subsections, we establish some pricing
properties of the most-collusive equilibrium that are based on understanding how the immediate19
gain from a deviation, along with the discounted future losses from the deviation, vary over the
demand cycle.
5.1.1 Severe price wars
The results in this subsection apply to the demand range where severe price wars can occur. For
all demand cycles, mixed-strategy price wars can occur in a period with demand parameter ￿ if
and only if the capacity is between the Cournot duopoly equilibrium quantity with zero costs and
the demand for the good when price is zero, i.e. x 2 (r¤(￿);X(￿)). Both bounds on the capacity
are strictly increasing in the demand parameter ￿. As capacity increases, the range of demand
parameters such that mixed-strategy price wars can occur in that period increases as well.
Theorem 1 For all ￿ 2 £, there exists cl(￿) and ch(￿) such that:
(i) a mixed-strategy price war can occur in a period with demand parameter ￿ if and only if
c 2 [cl(￿); ch(￿)];
(ii) cl(￿0) ·cl(￿) and ch(￿0) ·ch(￿) if and only if ￿0 ¸￿, for all ￿; ￿0 2 £.
Although not statedin thetheoremitself, it is possiblethat cl(￿) ·0 orch(￿) exceedsthehighest
cost that permits positive pro…t for some ￿ 2 £. If this is the case, then under no circumstances
can that period of demand have a mixed-strategy price war.
5.1.2 Cost of capacity and prices in booms versus recessions
In the pricing model without capacity constraints studied in Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991),
one of the strongest implications is that prices in two periods with the same demand, one in the
boom and one in the recession, are always weakly greater in the boom. This result has lent itself
nicely to empirical tests.21
In our model, pricing will not be consistently higherin boomsor recessionsfor all marginal costs
of capacity. Thereare, in fact, marginal costswherea consistent inequality between pricesin booms
andrecessions cannot beestablished. However, when capacity costsin an industry are high enough,
or low enough, there are strong testable predictions for most-collusive pricing patterns. Theorem 2
21Two empirical papers that utilize the predictions of Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) are Borenstein and
Shepard (1996) with US retail gasoline data and Rosenbaum and Sukharomana (2001) with US cement industry
data.20
establishes the fact that there is a lowest marginal cost, cb, such that if theindustry’s marginal cost
exceeds this level, all prices will have a predictable pattern where prices in the boom are no greater
than prices ofperiods withthesamedemand parameterintherecession. Thisresult impliesthat the
Haltiwanger and Harrington pricing pattern is reversed ifcapacity costs arehigh enough. Formally,
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While the proof of Theorem 2 is presented in the Appendix I, the heuristic explanation of the
proof follows from the examples of thegains and losses at the beginning of this section. Ifmarginal
cost ofcapacity is high enough, then the…rms will alwayschoose to colludewith capacities that are
small relative to thedemand cycle. At small enough capacity levels, thepunishment incurred aftera
defection will be lowest in thehighest demand periods. Now takethetwo demand periodson either
side of the peak. At any given price, the punishment from defecting in the period that precedes
the peak will be lower than the losses in the period following the peak. Since, at any …xed price,
the gain from a deviation in these two periods is the same, the incentivecompatibility constraint in
the boom period binds morestrongly than in the recession. Hence, both higher revenue and higher
prices are sustainable in the comparable recession period.
In a similar vain, consistent pricing patterns can also exists in industries with low marginal cost
of capacity. Pricing properties in this case are slightly more delicate than the high cost case.22
Theorem 3 There exists xr 2 (xb;X) such that for all xc(c;–) > xr; if ￿t0 = ￿t00 where 1 · t0 <
b t < t00 ·¿, then:
22Not all models will exhibit the pricing behavior speci…ed in Theorem 3. Take the example: D(pt; ￿t) = ￿t(12 ¡









. For all cost speci…cations the most-collusive equilibrium price
comparison of period 2 versus period 4 follows the pattern of Theorem 2.21
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The intuition behind Theorem 3 is straight forward: If the most-collusive capacity is large
enough, relative to the demand cycle, both the immediategain from a defection and the individual
period loss after a defection are increasing in the demand parameter. Therefore, the future loss
from deviating is greater in comparable boom periods than recession periods. At equal current
demand levels, the gain from a defection is the same for these two periods. Hence, the incentive
constraint binds …rst and more strongly in the recession period. Both the expected revenues and
the prices are higher in comparable boom periods.
Figure 4 summarizes theimplicationsofTheorems 2 and 3. Thecomplexity ofthe model places
a limit onthecharacterofmost-collusivepricing wecan proveanalytically. Inparticular, theprecise
range in terms of marginal costs and discount factors for each of the three most-collusive patterns




To provide concrete examples of how capacity constraints a¤ect market equilibria, we parameterize
the model and conduct numerical simulations of the most-collusive equilibrium. These numerical
examples give a more detailed picture of the collusive pricing patterns over the demand cycle. In
doing so, we adopt the functional form assumptionsused by Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991), so
that theresultsofourmodel canbeeasily comparedto thosedescribedin theirpaper.23 Speci…cally,
demand is parameterized as: D(pt; ￿t) = ￿t ¡400pt and we use an eight-period cyclewhich varies in
terms of the intercept ￿t, given as £= f100;125; 150; 175;200; 175; 150;125g. We analyze equilibria
23Although Haltiwanger and Harrington analyze a market with three …rms, whereas we focus on a duopoly. The
details involved with solving the constrained maximization problems is discussed in Appendix III.22
under three capacity marginal cost levels. For each marginal cost, the discount factor is varied
within the range [–(c);–(c)]. We focus our attention on (a) the relative pricing during booms and
busts, (b) the cyclicality of prices, and (c) the bene…ts from endogenizing capacity choices.
Figure5 is thelow cost example; prices follow thepredictions ofTheorem 3; at thesamedemand
level prices are lower in the recession than in the boom for all discounts plotted. This result is
driven by the fact that capacity is so cheap that it is most productive for the cartel to hold excess
capacity to increase the severity of punishment. These results mirror those in Haltiwanger and
Harrington (1991) where …rms are without capacity constraints. The high capacity levels imply
that punishment is greatest during high demand periods, reducing the incentive to deviate during
booms, relative to recessions. This pricing pattern holds for almost all discount factors, only very
close to –(c) is there a di¤erence. Just as in the limitless capacity setting, prices are strongly
pro-cyclical at high discounts, but become counter-cyclical for low enough discount factors. The
counter-cyclicality stems from the fact that as the discount factor falls, …rms reduce prices in the
highest demand periods to sustain collusion because the largest one-shot gainsare in these periods.
Figure 6 plotsthemost-collusiveequilibrium pricesfor a high cost example. Thepricing pattern
is starkly di¤erent than the low cost case; the prices follow the predictions of Theorem 2 and are
always strongly pro-cyclical. When theprice ofcapacity ishigh, equilibrium capacity levelsare low.
This increases the incentive to deviate during boom periods, relative to an equal demand period
in the recession. To counteract this, …rms lower prices during booms, relative to an equal demand
period in the recession. Despite this, prices never become counter-cyclical because capacity is too
expensive to hold for punishment. Instead, the …rmskeep capacitiessmall to lock inthehigh pro…ts
from the highest demand periods.
Another interesting feature of the high cost equilibrium is that in period 1; at the discount
factor 0:8; the collusivepricing is the same as thenon-cooperative mixed-strategy pricing given the
equilibrium capacities. This is an example ofthe mixed-strategy pricewars detailed in Theorem 1.
In this demand period, the two …rms will almost surely name di¤erent prices in equilibrium; this
would have the appearance of a single-period undercutting price war that occurs at the beginning
of every demand cycle. In the…gure, theline from prices 0:05625 to 0:075 represents thecontinuous
support of the mixed-strategy pricing. This severe price war does not occur in the equilibrium
for the lower discount factors 0:78 and 0:76. The …rms instead …nd it optimal to choose larger
capacities because their additional impatience signi…cantly lowers sustainable price levels at low
capacity levels.
Figure 7 plots the medium cost case. In this example, both pricing patterns of Theorems 2 and23
3 are evident. For the two largest discount factors, the prices follow the pattern of Theorem 2;
the three lowest discount factors show pricing patterns consistent with Theorem 3. The collusive
pricing at the intermediate discount factor 0:68 does not follow either theorem. Instead, we see
that prices are lower in the boom for the higher demand levels and lower in the recession for the
demand level 125.
These numerical examples underline the importance of including capacity as a strategic tool
when analyzing and testing for collusion. Previous empirical papers test for collusion using the
Haltiwanger and Harrington result that, conditional on current demand, prices will be higher if
demand isexpected to grow. Our results suggest that thismay not bea powerful test sincecollusion
may exist even if prices don’t follow the predictions of Haltiwanger and Harrington. Furthermore,
the medium cost case implies that these inequalities may change along the demand cycle. This
suggests that empirical tests may want to focus on periods around exogenous changes in the cost
of capacity and explicitly test for an inequality reversal.
6.2 Pro…ts
By endogenizing capacity, …rms are able to cater capacity choices to best facilitate collusion. Next
we compare the bene…ts of capacity as a strategic tool by calculating equilibrium pro…ts under
four scenarios: monopoly, colluding in both capacity and prices, colluding in prices but having
non-cooperative capacities, and non-cooperative behavior.24 The third scenario represents markets
where collusion takes place after capacity choices have been made; Davidson and Deneckere (1990)
refer to this as semi-collusion. We calculate pro…ts, relative to monopoly levels for each of the
discount/capacity cost combinations discussed above. The results are striking.
While it is not surprising that there are large di¤erences between the non-cooperative pro…ts
and the other three scenarios, we …nd that including capacity as a strategic tool can have large
e¤ects on pro…ts levels, especially when capacity costs are low. As the discount factor in the low
cost scenario drops below 0.56, semi-collusive pro…ts fall dramatically, while pro…ts when …rms
collude both in prices and capacities remain near monopoly levels.
24This calculation is the pro…t atthe non-cooperative symmetric candidate capacities. Thisprovides anapproximate
average pro…t from asymmetric equilibria. These capacities are also used for the calculation of most-collusive prices
at the non-cooperative capacities. See Lepore (2006) for the characterization of the symmetric candidate capacities.24
7 Extending the model: Allowing for capacity ‡exibility
The model can be extended to allow for ‡exible capacity levels without a substantive alteration of
themain results. We allow thecapacity to be ‡exiblein a speci…cway. That is, there isboth a time
lag to alter capacity and a …xed cost to adjust capacity. The time lag is denoted as T 2 f1;2; :::g
and is the number of pricing periods it takes to alter capacity. The adjustment cost d 2 R+ is the
…xed cost for any change from the current capacity level.
Proposition 3 For any T 2 f1; 2; :::g, there exists d¤(T) 2 R++ rf1g such that if d ¸ d¤(T),




t=1 for all – 2 (–(c);1).
The argument is based on …rst showing that for all positive time lags, there is a …nite…xed cost
such that the optimal punishment after a deviation (price or capacity) does not involve altering
of capacity levels. Second, we show that for all positive time lags, there exists a …nite …xed cost
such that no joint change in capacity levels from initial levels is ever pro…table. The combination
of these two facts guarantees that, for all d greater than the maximum ofthe two …xed costs: (i) at
each pricing period and the initial capacity choice the optimization problems are identical to the
in‡exible capacity game, and (ii) at each period after the initial period it is not pro…table to alter
capacities to enhance collusive pro…ts.
8 Conclusion
We establish a predictive theory of collusive pricing over demand cycles for homogeneous product
industries with endogenous long run capacity and short run price competition. Two key features
drive the results in our model: (i) because of the capacity constraints, gains from deviating from
collusive prices do not increase monotonically with demand; and (ii) the loss after a deviation is
di¤erent for two periods of identical demand, if they di¤er in location on the business cycle. The
most-collusive pricing predictions depend on the capacity costs and fall into two categories. Our
main pricing result is with regards to how prices compare on either side of thedemand peak. If the
marginal cost of capacity is high enough, pricing in two periods with the same demand will be at
least as small (much of the time smaller) in theboom than in the recession. While, if the marginal
cost of capacity is low enough, pricing in two periods with the same demand will be at least as
large (much of the time larger) in the boom than in the recession; the interval of discounts where25
this is true grows towards the unit interval as the cost of capacity decreases towards zero. Finally,
there is the possibility of a third region of costs in the middle where no blanket pricing patterns
are true when comparing booms and recession.
The Bertrand price competition model in Haltiwanger and Harrington predicts that collusive
pricesare weakly lower insimilardemand periods in recessionsthan in booms. Thefact that, in our
model, all pricing implications are not the same for all capacity costs, highlights the importance
of this feature as a determinant of collusive pricing in any industry. The …ndings in this paper
endorsetheidea that cyclical variation in pricing is dependent on theexpectation of futuredemand
as suggested by Haltiwanger and Harrington, with the caveat that how these prices vary over the
cycle depends heavily on the long run capacity cost in an industry.26
9 Appendix I: Proof of primary results
Proof of Proposition 1. First we show that given the capacity is …xed at x, there exists
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Note that by construction [–;1] µ §(c) µ [0; 1], and the constraint sets are closed in –. A closed
subset of a compact set is compact, therefore §(c) is compact and the min §(c) exists. De…ne the
discount factor –(c) =min§(c). This discount must weakly less than –, thus –(c) · – <1 and –(c)
satis…es the statement of the proposition.
























§(c) is non-empty because, from the …rst proposition, –(c) must be in the set. Both constraints are
continuous in –, hence the constraint set is closed. §(c) µ [0;–(c)] a compact set, a closed subset
of a compact set is compact, therefore §(c) is compact. De…ne the discount –(c) = min§(c) and
notice that it meets the criteria of the statement of the proposition.
Proof of Theorem 1. Themixed strategy pricewars canonly occur in a demand period with pa-
rameter￿ifxc(c;–) 2 (r¤(￿); X(￿)). Forall costc 2 (0; c) wherec =min
©




the range of xc(c; –) is limited by c. If we denote
cl(￿) =inf fc 2 (0;c)jxc(c;–) 2 (r¤(￿); X(￿)) for some – 2 (–(c);1]g
25The set ¢(x;–) is formally de…ned in section 10.2.2 equation 9. The set ©(c; –) is formally de…ned in section
10.2.3 equation 10.27
and
ch(￿) =sup fc 2 (0;c)jxc(c; –) 2 (r¤(￿);X(￿)) for some – 2 (–(c);1]g,
then (i) is immediate.
The second statement of the theorem, (ii) is true based on showing that both r¤(￿) and X(￿)
are non-decreasing in ￿. X(￿) is non-decreasing in ￿ based on assumption 2. We show that r¤(￿)
is increasing ￿ by contradiction. Suppose that ￿0 >￿ and r¤(￿0) <r¤(￿):At r¤(￿) the following …rst



























r¤(￿) +P(2r¤(￿); ￿0) ¸0:
Based on the strict concavity of P(q + r¤(￿); ￿0)q the optimal choice r(r¤(￿); ￿0) for the …rm
will exceed r¤(￿). The equilibrium quantity r¤(￿0) is such that r(r¤(￿0);￿0) ¡ r¤(￿0) = 0, hence
r(r¤(￿);￿0)¡r¤(￿) ¸r(r¤(￿0); ￿0)¡r¤(￿0). Since, based on Lemma 1, Krepsand Scheinkman (1983),
r(q;￿0) is non-increasing in q, and r(q; ￿0)¡q is decreasing in q, thus, r¤(￿0) ¸ r¤(￿) contradict the
previous inequality.
Proof of Theorem 2. First we prove that 9xb 2 [0; X] such that 8x0 > xb if ￿t0 = ￿t00 where
1 · t0 < b t < t00 · ¿, then: 1-4. For all £, if x = D(pum
¿ ;￿¿), then at or bellow this capacity the
above statement is satis…ed, because all pairs of comparable periods across the cycle have equal
revenue at the constrained monopoly level. Therefore, the set of such capacities Xb is non-empty.
Denoteby xb theleast upper bound of Xb. Next wemust show that for each – 2 (0; 1) there exists a

















Note that (2) will hold at zero and ¥(c; –) >0 for all c 2 (0; c(–)). The monopoly pro…t is strictly
concave in x hence ¥(c;–) is a function.26 ¥(c; –) = 0 at c = c(–) and ¥(c;–) ! +1 as c ! 0.
The monopoly pro…t is jointly continuous in c and x therefore ¥(c;–) is continuous in c. Based
on the median value theorem there must be a cost c 2 (0;c(–)) such that ¥(c;–) < xb. Clearly,
26See the proof of proposition 4 is Appendix II for proof of this statement.28
xc(c;–) ·¥(c;–) therefore the set of cost ‡b = fc 2 (0;c(–)) j xc(c; –) <xbg is non-empty. Denote
by cb = inf f‡bg, the smallest cost such that the statements 1-4 are true.
Proof of Theorem 3. In term of the exogenous capacity subgame, we need to show there
exists a lowest capacity such that for all capacities greater pricing patterns follow statements 1-4.
The proof of this is straightforward, …rst we show there exists an example of a capacity where the
statements are true for it and all capacities greater. The capacity x = X is an example. Notice
that at x¸ X the gain from defection and non-discounted loss from punishment is the exact same
for all periods as the repeated Bertrand pricing model. Therefore the implications of Theorem 7 of
Haltiwanger and Harrington (1991) applies to this model, and the statements of this theorem are
true. So the set of capacities Xr =fxj8x0 ¸ x1¡4 are trueg is not empty. The set is bounded, so
the in…mum of the set exists and we de…ne it as xr = inf Xr.
Take x1 = x2 = X and an arbitrary discount factor – 2 (0; 1) and we consider the possibility
that (i) incentiveconstraint might not bind for some periods, (ii) only the under-cutting constraint
might bind for some periods and (iii) the price might be bound to non-cooperative pricing in other
periods.
(i) Consider two arbitrary comparable periods t0 and t00 such that 1 · t0 < b t < t00 · ¿ and
￿t0 =￿t00. Suppose the two comparable periods are such the constraint binds at least the recession
period at x1 = x2 = X, and look at property 2. Rc
t00(X;–) < Rc
t0(X; –) for all – 2 (–p(X); –p(X))
and based on the continuity of the two functions, there exists † > 0 small enough such that the
revenues will still be ordered Rc
t00(X ¡†;–) <Rc
t0(X ¡†; –) for X ¡†.
(ii) Next consider any period with monopoly pricing, where both the incentive constraints are
slack. Based on the continuity of the gains and losses in prices and capacities, there exists † > 0
small enough such that if
Lt(pc(X; –); X; –) > Gu
t (pc
t(X;–);X)
for a period t, then
Lt(pc(X ¡†;–);X ¡†; –) > Gu
t (pc
t(X ¡†; –); X ¡†)
for X ¡† as well.
(iii) At the capacity levels X the non-cooperative pricing is pn
t (X) = 0 for all t. For all – 2
(1=2;1) prices are above non-cooperative levels at capacities X. Hence, by a continuity argument
analogous to those above there exists † >0 such that this must also be true for X ¡†.
Therefore, we know that there exists xr that satis…es the proposition and is less than X.29
Proof of Proposition 3. Throughout theproof, we …x T asan arbitrary positiveinteger. Denote
by the single period pro…ts …n
t (x;y) =Rn(x;y;￿t) ¡cx.
First, we prove that non-cooperative equilibrium pricing in each period stage-game combined
with not altering the initial capacity capacities is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game
with time lag T and …xed adjustment cost d. This is the case if, 8k ¸ 1, x 2 [b xc(c; –); X],







The y is permitted to be any capacity; thisinsures staying at thecollusivecapacity isa subgame
perfect equilibrium for the non-deviator after any capacity cheat. The right hand side of (3) is
bounded so there is a cost d such that (3) is true. De…ne the interval of such d where (3) is true as
D1(T).
For a …rm to credibly commit to increasing its capacity upon defection, it must bein its interest
to do so, conditional on a defection. For this to be thecase, the increase in discounted pro…ts from
a capacity change must be greater than the adjustment costs associated with this change. If not,
the …rm would rather punish using its collusive capacity level. A …rm will only alter capacity if it
is pro…table to do so over someperiod of time k ¸1. Condition (3) guarantees that no change from
the most-collusive capacity levels will be bene…cial to either …rm, for any length of time during
punishment.
There is also an interval of costs such that the …rms will not bene…t from jointly moving to
a new capacity on the most-collusive equilibrium path. The same argument as above applies so
that we can restrict ourselves to negating a bene…t from a single deviation. Thus, if 8k ¸ 1; 8x 2







The di¤erence on the right hand side is …nite. Hence, there exists a set …nite real numbers that
satisfy (4). Label this set of adjustment costs D2(T).
Next we show that staying with the most-collusive capacity is the optimal punishment. If we
look at carrot/stick punishments interms ofcapacities, then theoptimal penal codeis to not change30












s(e x; e x) ¡…c
s(x; x)) (5)
If d is large enough, then there is no e x and x such that it is optimal to alter x for punishment. In
essence, the condition (3) guarantees that staying with x is part of the an optimal penal code. For
all …xed T, the right hand side is bounded, therefore there exists an interval of costs such that (3)








The minimum is well de…ned because the constraint set is non-empty, closed and bounded below.
Noticethat 8d¸ d¤(T), theincentiveconstraintsarethesameforthethemost-collusiveequilibrium
at all periods for pricing and initially for capacity. No deviation in capacities or prices, joint or




will also be the most-collusive solution to the ‡exible capacity game.
10 Appendix II: Existence issues
10.1 Monopoly prices and capacities




c; –; and £.
Proof. The proof is broken down into four steps.
First we characterize each maximization problem of the pricing subgames. Based on the as-
sumptions A.1-4 we show there is a unique solution to the problem constrained maximization
problem
pm
t (x) = arg max
p2[0;P(￿)]
fpD(p; ￿t)jD(p;￿t) ·xg for all ￿t 2 £ (7)
for any subgame. If ￿t is such that D(p; ￿t) <x, then the solution to themaximization (7) problem
is the solution to the unconstrained problem pum
t = argmaxp2[0;P(￿)]fpD(p; ￿t)g and the revenue
is uniquely equal to pum
t D(pum
t ;￿t). If the constraint binds, then D(pm
t (x); ￿t) = x and the price
is uniquely determined by this equality by inverting the demand function pm
t (x) =P(x;￿t). Thus,31







t ; ￿t) if D(pum
t ; ￿t) < x;
P(x; ￿t)x if D(pum
t ; ￿t) ¸ x:
Second, we provethe monopoly revenue of each period is continuous, quasi-concave (strictly on
the relevant region) and bounded.
Notice that for all ￿t, Rm(x;￿t) is bounded for all x ¸ 0 between 0 and pum
t D(pum
t ;￿t) and
non-decreasing in x. We …rst prove directly it is concave for all x ¸ 0. This implies that for all
x ¸0
Rm(‚x+(1¡‚)x0;￿t) ¸‚Rm(x;￿t) +(1 ¡‚)Rm(x0;￿t) for all ‚ 2 [0;1]. (8)
This is trivially true when min fx; x0g > D(pum
t ;￿t) or max fx;x0g · D(pum
t ;￿t). We are left
to verify concavity when x · D(pum
t ;￿t) and x0 > D(pum
t ;￿t). First suppose x · D(pum
t ; ￿t),
x0 > D(pum
t ; ￿t) and ‚x+(1¡‚)x0 ·D(pum
t ;￿t). De…ne xm
t =D(pum













If x · D(pum
t ; ￿t), x0 > D(pum
t ;￿t) and ‚x + (1 ¡ ‚)x0 > D(pum
t ; ￿t), then pum
t D(pum
t ;￿t) ¸
‚P(x;￿t)x +(1 ¡ ‚)pum
t D(pum
t ;￿t) is true for all ‚ 2 [0; 1]. Hence, Rm(x;￿t) is concave for all
x ¸0. We can further conclude that Rm(x; ￿t) is strictly concave on x2 [0; xm
t ].
Next we prove the monopoly revenue of each cycle is continuous, quasi-concave (strictly on the
relevant region) and bounded.
Wedenote Rm(x;–) =
P¿
t=1–t¡1Rm(x; ￿t), because –t¡1 2 (0; 1) for all t, and each Rm(x;￿t) is
boundedtheweighted sum Rm(x; –) is also bounded. Theweighted sum ofconcave functionsonis a
concavefunction, thereforeRm(x;–) is concaveon x¸ 0. We need to show that Rm(x;–) is strictly
concave on x 2 [0; xm
b t ], where xm
b t = D(pum
b t ;￿b t). De…ne, Rm
¡b t(x;–) =
P
t2f1;2;:::¿grb t –t¡1Rm(x; ￿t),
and note that it is concave for all x¸0. Rm(x;–) is strictly concave on x 2 [0;xm
b t ], if
Rm(‚x+(1 ¡‚)x0;–) >‚Rm(x;–) +(1 ¡‚)Rm(x0;–) for all x;x0 2 [0; xm
b t ]32
We can re-write this expression as
Rm(‚x+(1¡‚)x0;￿b t) +Rm
¡b t(‚x+(1 ¡‚)x0; –)
> ‚Rm
¡b t(x;–) +‚Rm(x; ￿b t) +(1¡‚)Rm
¡b t(x0;–)+(1¡‚)Rm(x0; ￿b t):
Based on the concavity of Rm
¡b t(x;–) on [0; xm
b t ], the expression reduces to
Rm(‚x+(1 ¡‚)x0; ￿b t) > ‚Rm(x; ￿b t) +(1¡‚)Rm(x0; ￿b t) for all x;x0 2 [0;xm
b t ]
which is true by the strict concavity of P(x;￿b t)x.
Finally, we show that the pro…t function of the cycle is strictly concave and bounded, i.e., the




We de…ne the costs over a single cycle of x units of capacity as C(–) =
P¿
t=1 –t¡1c. The
single cycle monopoly pro…t ¦m(x; c;–) = Rm(x;–) ¡C(–)x is concave and bounded on all x ¸
0. This is enough to guarantee the existence of a maximum, but for uniqueness we …rst show
that any x > xm
b t is not a maximum of ¦m(x; c;–). Suppose that e x > xm
b t is a maximum of
¦m(x;c; –), then ¦m(e x; c; –) ¸ ¦m(xm
b t ;c;–), which is the same expression as Rm(e x; –) ¡C(–)e x ¸
Rm(xm
b t ;–)¡C(–)(xm
b t ). Notethat Rm(e x;–) =Rm(xm
b t ;–), thus that cost function must be such that
C(–)e x· C(–)xm
b t . This is a contradiction because, C(–)x is an increasing function.
The monopoly capacity choice problem can be reduced to
xm(c; –) =argmax
©




On x 2 [0;xm
b t ], ¦m(x; c; –) is strictly concave and the constraint de…nes a convex and compact
(closed and bounded subset of R) set. Therefore, the maximum xm(c; –) is unique, and from the
initial argument of the proof, there is a unique monopoly price determined by xm(c;–), pm
t (c;–) =
pm
t (xm(c;–)) for all t.
10.2 Most-collusive equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the optimal symmetric collusive capacities and prices of the two
…rms.33
10.2.1 Symmetric capacities
Throughout the paper the analysis is restricted to the case of symmetric capacities. This is done
primarily because, it isnot obvious how to establish a focal most-collusive pricewhen capacities are
asymmetric without the explicit use of a collusive demand rationing rule. In the case of symmetric
capacities, whenthecollusivepriceissuch that D(pt; ￿t) < 2x, animplicit assumption is that halfof
the demand is given to each …rm; a standard assumption of collusive models. When capacities are
asymmetric thereare many collusivedemand rationing rules that reduce to Di(pt;￿t) =D(pt;￿t)=2





D(pt;￿t)=2 if x2 ¸D(pt; ￿t)=2
x2 otherwise





D(pt; ￿t)¡D2(pt;￿t) if x1 ¸ D(pt;￿t) ¡D2(pt;￿t)
x1 otherwise
.
Theabove collusiverationing rulereduces to the one half-one half rule when x1 =x2. Theproblem
is that under thisrule the two …rm can most often disagree on thepro…t maximizing collusiveprice.
There is only one rule that reduces to the one half-one half rule, when capacities are symmetric,
where the optimal collusive price is always the same for both …rms. The demand is giving to the










10.2.2 Characterization of optimal price choice
Denote by Pt, the Borel probability measures on the price space [0;P(￿t)], which are endow with
the topology of weak convergence. Denote by P, the cross product of the mixed strategy spaces
for each t, P =
Q1
t=1Pt and denote by ￿, an element of the set P. We de…ne the set of prices that













Weassumethat randomizationdevicesarenot publicly observableex post andthat …rmsonly utilize
trigger strategies where selecting price outside the support of the most-collusive pricing strategy is
considered a cheat. This e¤ectively eliminates mixed strategies as optimal choices unless they are
non-cooperative equilibrium of that periods stage game.


























is both bounded and contin-









is bounded and continuous on P. The set of probability measures on a compact metric space is
compact, hence each set Pt is compact . By Tychono¤’s product theorem the set P is compact.
The constraints are continuos in ￿ 2 P, hence the constraint set ¢(x;–) is closed. By construction
¢(x; –) is a subset of the space P. ¢(x; –) is a closed subset of a compact space and therefore is
compact. Since (pn
t (x))1
t=1 2 ¢(x; –), the set ¢(x;–) is non-empty. A continuous function on a
non-empty compact set always attains a maximum, therefore ￿c(x; –) exists.
Uniqueness: Note that based on Proposition 4 the revenue function for each t has the unique
maximum pm






















Now suppose that there are multiple maximizers. Denote by b P the set of maximizers and by b Pt
the set of all prices for period t that are part of a maximizing price vector 8t = f1; 2; :::g. Denote
by (b pt)1
t=1 the price vector where each b pt is de…ned by









¯￿t 2 b Pt
¾
.
The higher the price is in the subgame at time t the harsher the loss from defection is in every
other pricing period. The price vector (b pt)1
t=1 yields the at least as much future loss 8t =f1;2; :::g35
of all the price vectors in b Pt, and hence the incentive constraints for each t must hold 8￿ 2 b P,
therefore (b pt)
1
t=1 2 ¢(x;–). By the construction of (b pt)
1
t=1, the total revenue in each period is
maximal among b Pt because the functions are single peaked and strictly decreasing away from the












8￿t 2 b Pt rb pt. Therefore, the total revenue
of (b pt)1


















8￿ 2 b P r(b pt)
1
t=1.
This contradicts the optimality of any non-singular set of strategies b P.
10.2.3 Characterization of optimal capacity choice




, where X =max￿2£X(￿). The most-collusive capacity







j ¦c(»; c;–) ¸ max
xi
f¦n
i (xi; »;c; –)g
¾
. (10)
The most-collusive must be a solution to the constrained maximization problem,
»c(c;–) 2 argmaxf¦c(»; c;–) j » 2 ©(c;–)g.
We denote by xc(c;–) the most-collusive capacity choice; which is the smallest capacity in the set
»c(c;–) when it is not a singleton.
Proposition 6 If ©(c;–) non-empty, then a solution xc(c;–) exists.









. A function p(x) is
continuous at xifwhenever xk ! x, pk = p(xk) for all k and p =limk!1pk, we have that p 2 p(x).
To verify the continuity of each function ￿c(x; –) in x, we suppose that there is a sequence xk ! x
and a sequence pk =￿c(xk; –) for all k such that pk ! e p and e p 6= ￿c(x;–). Because the constraints
hold for all k, taking the limit as k ! 1 we can conclude that , e p 2 ¢(x; –). Thus, e p is a feasible


















































because, pk = ￿c(xk; –). Next we take the limit as k ! 1, and based on the continuity of the























. The sum of
















is continuous. Both ¦c(»;c;–) and maxxi f¦n













and hence is a closed
subset of a compact set, therefore ©(c;–) is compact. A continuous function on a non-empty
compact set attains a maximum; if ©(c; –) 6=?, then xc(c; –) exists.
11 Appendix III: Methodology for calculations
The problem is estimated using a backward induction approach. The most-collusive equilibrium
pricing solution does not havea closed form when thecapacity is not given a speci…c value. There-
fore, at each discount factor a discrete grid of capacities is used and the most-collusive prices are
found for each capacity. In the capacity stage the problem is a discrete maximization subject to
the capacity incentive constraint.
11.1 Pricing stage




weuse a discrete grid of capacities between one half










for t =1; :::;8;





0 if x ¸￿t
(￿t¡x)
2
1600 if x 2 [￿t
3 ;￿t]
(￿t¡2x)
400 x if x · ￿t
3
.




















Where f(¢) is a convex penalty function, with f(0) = 0 . The price pl
t is the pure strategy price
that give the same expected revenue as the non-cooperative equilibrium pricing in period t. In the
case that pc
t = pl
t the program is re-run substituting rt for both yt and zt and only optimizing in
terms of the other period prices. We denote by Rc(x;–), the revenue that comes from the solution
of the program (11). This program is solved for the entire grid of capacities.
11.2 Capacity stage
For the same – and a given cost c, we take the discrete set of capacities and solve the following
problem. De…ne Rn(z; x; –) as the non-cooperative equilibrium for a …rm when it plays z and its
rival plays x. Denote the most-collusive pro…t for the …rst cycle by
¦c
8(x; c; –) = Rc(x; –) ¡
P8
t=1–t¡1cx:
Denote the maximal deviation non-cooperative pro…t for the …rst cycle by
b ¦n









The most collusive capacity solves the discrete maximization problem:












The method here is to run a program that starts at the most pro…table symmetric capacity pair
and checks ifit is incentivecompatible, then moves to thenext most pro…table capacity pair and so
on. The …rst capacity pair that is incentivecompatible is the most-collusive equilibrium capacities.39
A Figures and Tables
A.1 Figures
 
In some periods prices are below 
constrained monopoly levels 








Figure 1: Basic most-collusive pricing regions, by discount and cost.











Figure 2: The immediate gain from a defection with capacity …xed.40











Figure 3: The single period loss after a defection with …xed capacity.
 
No simple pricing pattern 
 
Prices are lower in booms 
 







































































Figure 7: Most-collusive pricing for median costs, c =0:001.43
A.2 Tables
Table 1: Relative Expected Pro…ts for Low Capacity Costs
Collusion with
Discount Monopoly Most-Collusive Non-cooperative capacities Non-cooperative
0.64 1 1 0.959 0.569
0.62 1 0.995 0.935 0.559
0.60 1 0.976 0.920 0.548
0.58 1 0.959 0.892 0.537
0.56 1 0.934 0.841 0.525
0.54 1 0.896 0.514 0.514
0.52 1 0.825 0.501 0.501
Table 2: Relative Expected Pro…ts for High Capacity Costs
Collusion with
Discount Monopoly Most-Collusive Non-cooperative capacities Non-cooperative
0.92 1 0.982 0.945 0.839
0.88 1 0.977 0.941 0.839
0.84 1 0.961 0.935 0.839
0.82 1 0.947 0.928 0.840
0.80 1 0.937 0.918 0.840
0.78 1 0.903 0.903 0.842
0.76 1 0.849 0.845 0.845
Table 3: Relative Expected Pro…ts for Medium Capacity Costs
Collusion with
Discount Monopoly Most-Collusive Non-cooperative capacities Non-cooperative
0.76 1 0.998 0.998 0.637
0.72 1 0.998 0.997 0.624
0.68 1 0.996 0.987 0.614
0.64 1 0.988 0.956 0.597
0.60 1 0.970 0.917 0.580
0.56 1 0.924 0.837 0.56444
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